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RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0000  
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 0000  
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY 0000  
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 0000

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SENSITIVE  
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E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: [KNNP](#) [AORC](#) [ENRG](#) [MNUC](#) [PARM](#) [PREL](#) [CDG](#) [UNGA](#) [IAEA](#) [NPT](#) [UP](#)  
SUBJECT: NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT): RESPONSE  
TO UKRAINIAN NON-PAPERS

REF: A. A) STATE 40237  
[1](#)B. B) STATE 06970

[1](#)1. (U) This is an action message; see paragraph 3 below.

[1](#)2. (U) SUMMARY: Ref A requested relevant reporting from host governments most likely to influence the outcome of critical upcoming NPT meetings. Ukraine responded (ref B) with a non-paper titled &Sharing Informal Views on the NPT: Ukrainian viewpoint,<sup>8</sup> that laid out Ukraine's position and built on a related working paper that the GOU submitted during the 2008 PrepCom ("Preparing for a Successful Review Conference 2010"). Department requests Embassy to make the points in para three below to appropriate MFA officials. END SUMMARY

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Action Request  
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[1](#)3. (U) Embassy should reply to Ukrainian officials, drawing on the following points, which may be left as a non-paper:

Begin text:

-- As President Obama stated in Prague on April 5, strengthening the NPT will be one of the Administration's top priorities over the next few years.

-- We are encouraged by your February non-paper on Ukraine's views and priorities in the NPT review process. Your views largely accord with ours.

-- It is clear that Parties should seek procedural success at the 2009 PrepCom and substantive success at the 2010 RevCon.

-- The United States will demonstrate further progress on fulfilling our disarmament-related obligations under Article VI and will be taking concrete steps, such as working to ratify the CTBT, beginning negotiations on a verifiable FMCT, and negotiating with Russia to follow on the START treaty before the end of 2009.

-- We want to work with Ukraine and other NPT Parties to encourage the universalization of the NPT and full compliance with its obligations, while discouraging countries from violating, and then withdrawing from, the Treaty.

-- Our two governments understand that solving issues such as noncompliance by Iran, North Korea and Syria will require concerted, consistent, multilateral diplomacy.

-- We both believe in the fundamental importance of IAEA safeguards and will work towards the universalization of the Additional Protocol.

-- We both acknowledge the existential danger of nuclear terrorism to our countries and the United States hopes to continue to work with other states to increase the security of nuclear materials world-wide. To this end, President Obama has committed to host a Global Summit on Nuclear

Security within the next year.

-- We also share with Ukraine the belief that international fuel banks could be an excellent solution to the challenge of sharing in the benefits of nuclear technology without increasing the risks of proliferation.

-- On other points raised in your non-paper, we are still formulating our policies. As you may know, Congress has required that the U.S. Government review its nuclear weapons policies as part of a Nuclear Posture Review, due later this year. The results of this review will help us address many additional nuclear weapon issues.

-- The President has made clear that the United States is committed to bringing about a world free of nuclear weapons. We look forward to cooperating closely with Ukraine throughout the NPT review process to the end.

End text

**14.** (SBU) NOTE FOR EMBASSY KYIV: There are some issues contained in the Ukrainian NPT non-paper that relate to START and a START follow-on agreement that will be addressed separately.

In addition, Ukraine's non-paper supports several positions that the United States cannot support, in part or in full. These include:

-- Changes in U.S. nuclear weapons policy, to include de-alerting, withdrawal to storage, and formalized reporting of nuclear weapons deployments and force levels;

-- Negotiation of a legally binding negative security assurances treaty; and

-- Establishment of a permanent NPT secretariat to support meetings and of a standing bureau to monitor compliance. Embassy should refer MFA interlocutors, specific concerns regarding these policies to Washington.

**15.** (U) Questions regarding this message may be directed to Scott Davis (ISN/MNSA), who can be reached at davisms@state.sgov.gov, davisms@state.gov, or 1-202-647-1141.

Please slug reply for the Department (ISN/MNSA), Geneva (CD), and USUN (POL).

CLINTON